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CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY, TRADITIONAL CRIME,
AND PUBLIC POLICY
RONALD C. KRAMER
Western Michigan University
ABSTRACT
Critical criminologists have often
ignored the serious problem of traditional
or common street crime. As a result, crime
prevention policy has been forfeited to the
political right or to those who advocate
ineffective liberal reforms. This paper
argues that critical criminology can make a
contribution to the formulation of public
policy concerning traditional crime.
Recent theoretical developments within the
criitical perspective on crime, as.well as
a variety of supporting data, are reviewed
and specific policy recommendations to
reduce traditional crime are offered.
These progressive recommendations cons-
titute an important alternative to the
individualistic approaches (liberal or
conservative) which now dominate crime
prevention policy.
Until very recently, most critical
criminologists, and the political left in
general, have not paid sufficient attention
to the problem of traditional crime. There
are a variety of reasons for this neglect
as Greenberg (1981) has pointed out. What
concerns me here are not the reasons, but
the consequences. The most important
consequence of this neglect has been the
forfeiture of crime prevention policy to
conservative forces. To many progressive
criminologists this is an unacceptable
situation. Traditional street crime is a
serious social problem in our society. By
whatever measure, there appears to be more
of this -crime than most of us are willing
to tolerate.
A related reason for progressives to be
concerned about traditional crime concerns
the victims of these offenses. LEAA
victimization surveys have found that the
highest incidence of violent and property
crime is "among the poor and unemployed,
specifically, the superexploited sectors of
the working class" (Platt, 1978). Thus,
the most likely victims of traditional
crime are those the political left sees as
its primary constituency; the working
class, the poor, and minorities. Even -if
the members of the working class are not
victimized directly by street crime, the
fear of such crime erodes the quality of
life undermining collective solidarity in
working class neighborhoods. As Gross
(1982) has recently suggested, the left
must take seriously popular anxiety about
crime and link these anxieties to progress-
ive political positions.
A number of recent works by critical
criminologists (Platt, 1978; 1982; Taylor,
1981;1982; Gross, 1982; Browning, 1982;
Bute, 1982; Currie, 1982; Michalowski,
1982) indicate a new willingness to face up
to the question of what "causes"
traditional criminal acts, and the issue of
how best to control or prevent these acts.
This development is especially important
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given the repeated failures of crime
control policy based on individualistic
perspectives which attempt to either
repress individual offenders of "cure"
them.
This paper reviews recent theoretical
developments within the critical crimin-
ology perspective, along with some sup-
porting empirical evidence, and then
suggests specific policy recommendations to
reduce traditional crime. Thus, the paper
is an attempt to contribute to the ongoing
policy debate concerning crime prevention
by suggesting some progressive alternatives
to current practices.
CAPITALISM, CLASS STRUCTURE, AND
TRADITIONAL CRIME
The critical criminology perspective is
rooted in Marxist social theory. One of
the strengths of Marxist theory is its
insistence that any social phenomenon must
be examined within the context of a
historically emergent social totality.
Crime, therefore, must be analyzed in the
context of its relationship to the struc-
ture of society as a whole. Mainstream
criminological theory in general does not
do this. Instead, mainstream theories
focus on the attributes of individuals or
the immediate social settings of these
individuals. As David Greenberg (1981:17)
points out concerning these theories:
The society itself rarely appears.
The possibility that its organization
- its way of producing and distribut-
ing material goods, and of organizing
its political and legal institutions,
for example - might have major
implications for the amount and kinds
of crime present in a society, as well
as for the character of its crime
control apparatus, is not even
considered.
Critical criminology, as a general
theoretical principle, asserts that crime
is based in class conflict and the
structured inequalities of class society.
The class divisions and their associated
forms of inequality under advanced
capitalism, therefore, generate the problem
of traditional crime. The critical
perspective, however, must not fall into
the trap of merely asserting that there is
a relationship between the social formation
of capitalism, especially its political and
economic structure, and traditional crime
without specifying what the linkages are
between the larger social order and crimin-
al behavior.
This section of the paper reviews
,theory and research on the concrete ways
the political economy of advanced capit-
alism generates crime. Four specific
topics are examined: 1) the surplus
population which is produced under the
conditions of late capitalism; 2) struc-
tured unemployment; 3) income inequality
and relative deprivation; and 4) captial-
isim and the destruction of cooperative
social relationships.
The Surplus Population
From the critical criminology perspec-
tive, "An understanding of crime in our
society begins with the recognition that
the crucial phenomenon to be considered is
not crime, per se, but the historical
development and operation of capitalist
society" (Quinney, 1980:39). An under-
standing of the emergence and reproduction
of class divisions and their associated
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forms of inequality are especially impor-
tant in this regard. To explain tradi-
tional crime, in particular, we first need
to see how the historical development of
capitalism creates a surplus population or
economic underclass which commits crime
partially as a response to problems of
survival and the brutalization of social
life.
Marxist social theory provides a
starting point for an analysis of the
historical development of the political
economy of capitalism. Marxism breaks with
philosophical idealism and insists that a
proper understanding of human action must
begin with the existing material conditions
and social relationships of people.
Marxist theory, thus, starts with an
analysis of the forces and social relations
of production and moves on to examine the
dialectical relationship between the mode
of production and the other cultural and
social structures of a society. Marxism
analyzes society as a social formation, an
articulated totality of economy, state,
ideology, and so on.
Immanent change is a fundamental char-
acteristicof social formations due to the
contradictions which exist within them.
These Lcontradictions are both necessary
for, and yet destructive of, these forma-
tions. The existence of classes and class
struggle is the fundamental contradiction
of capitalist society. According to Marx,
class it not an attribute of an individual
or group; it is a social relationship.
Classes are constituted by the social
relations of production. Under capitalism
these class relations are inherently ex-
ploitative and unstable. The existence of
classes implies class struggle and class
struggle implies change. As Quinney
(1980:45) notes, "All past history that
involves the development of capitalism is
the history of class struggle."
This class struggle is carried on, of
course, between workers and owners,
proletarians and capitalists. But class
divisions are also more complex. In
CApilal, Marx, (1867) introduced the terms
"relative redundant population" and
"industrial reserve army" in his analysis
of the effect of the growth of capital on
the working class. As Greenberg (1981:6.2)
notes:
Marx argued that capitalists respond
to the posibility of rising wages by
introducing machinery that displaces
workers. The ratio of constant
capital (machinery, raw materials) to
variable capital (wages) thus tends to
rise. Workers who lose their jobs in
this process, or who are never hired
in the first place, constitute the
relative redundant, surplus popula-
tion. Marx goes on to argue that the
existence of this population further
depresses wages, since employed
workers can be replaced by members of
the "industrial reserve army" if they
demand excessive wages.
Capitalism, therefore, systematically
generates a "surplus population", an
"unemployed sector of the working class
either dependent on fluctuations in the
economy or made obsolete by new technology"
(Quinney, 1980:55). This surplus popula-
tion or economic underclass lives under
social, economic, and political conditions
which can be described as devastating (Time
Magazine, 1977, Auletta, 1982). It is here
in the marginalized, demoralized, and super
exploited sector of the working class that
traditional crime often takes root and
flourishes.
It has long been noted by crimin-
ologists that there is a strong rela-
tionship between social class and
criminality (as measured in official
statistics). Despite the attempt of some
American criminologists to prove that this
relationship is a myth (Tittle, Villemez,
and Smith, 1978), the bulk of the evidence
continues to show that lower class people
do commit traditional crime at a much
higher rate than other classes. As
Braithwaite (1981:38) points out, "... it
has been demonstrated, with a degree of
consistency which is unusual in social
science, that lower class people, and
people living in lower class areas, have
higher official crime rates than other
groups."
Critical criminologists argue that
predatory crimes, such as burglary,
robbery, drug dealing, and hustling, are
often pursued by the members of the surplus
population out of the need to survive. As
Platt (1978:30) notes, "For this population
the economic conditions of life are
unusually desperate and degrading. The
high level of property crime and petty
hustlers cannot be separated from the
problems of survival."
The surplus population is also heavily
involved in intra-class acts of inter-
personal violence, as well as increasingly
cross-class acts of violence. Rape,
assault, child and wife beating, and
homicide result from the brutalization and
demoralization of life conditions for the
surplus population. As Quinney (1980:61)
observes, these "...conventional criminal
acts ... are pursued by those who are
already brutalized by the conditions of
capitalism."
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While the life conditions of the
surplus population under advanced capital-
ism are undoubtably related to criminal
behavior, there are other, more specific,
factors to be considered if we are to
deepen our understanding of the relation-
ship between social order and traditional
crime.
Structural Unemployment
One of the most significant of the
adverse conditions facing the surplus
population is a deep rooted and pervasive
level of structural unemployment. Struc-
tural unemployment, of course, also in-
creasingly effects millions in the skilled
working class and service oriented middle
class as well. High levels of unemployment
have a very strong relationship to as
variety of social problems, including, of
course, traditional street crime. As
Michalowski (1983:16) notes, "One of the
most enduring pieces of data about street
crinme is that they are overwhelmingly com-
mitted by the unemployed and under-
employed."
The evidence linking traditional crime
to unemployment is impressive. In a series
of brilliant studies, M. Harvey Brenner
(1975, 1976) has shown that between 1920-
3.940 and 1947-1973, in the United States,
Canada, England, Wales, and Scotland, there
has been a significant direct relationship
between unemployment and a wide variety of
measures of criminal activity.
Brenner's research is not limited to an
examination of the relationship between
unemployment and crime. He has also demon-
strated, in a study of New York mental
patients over a period of 127 years, that
the only significant factor accounting for
the rise and fall in admissions to mental
hospitals is employment (Brenner, 1973).
In addition, he has shown that such diverse
phenomena as cardiovascular disease, suic-
ide, and child abuse are correlated most
highly with unemployment rates. Brenner,
however, makes the strongest claims regard-
ing the existence of significant causal
impacts of the economy on traditional
crime. In a report to the Joint Economic
Committee of the U.S. Congress, Brenner
(1975) argued that a 1.4% rise in unem-
ployment during 1970 was "directly respon-
sible" for 7,660 state prison admissions
and 1,740 homicides. Later in the same
study, he concludes that a 1% increase in
unemployment sustained over six years would
be associated with. approximately 3,340
admissions to state prisons.
Other recent studies corroborate
Brenner's findings, for example, the U.S.
Bureau of Prisons has reported a correl-
ation of .77 between their inmate popula-
tion and the unemployment rate for 15
months earlier over a 20 year period. The
Bureau's report (1975) argues that unem-
ployment can be shown to be an effective
predictor (if not cause) of the crime rate.
Phillips, Votey, and Maxwell (1972:503)
have demonstrated through the methods of
econometrics that a "...labor force/not-in-
the-labor force formulation has greater
explanatory power than the not working
formulation, demonstrating the importance
of participation rates relative to unem-
ployment rates in explaining crime rates."
This is because unemployment rates under-
estimate the actual number of people out of
work. Thus, labor force participation may
be a crucial element in "... explaining
crime because participation rates capture
long-term trends as opposed to cyclical,
short-run fluctuations that are more likely
to be reflected by unemployment rates"
ployment and traditional crime can also be
linked to the notion of a structurally
generated "surplus population" by way of
"segmented labor market theories." Conven-
tional economics uses a "human capital"
theory to explain labor market success and
crime (labor market failure). This model,
of course, hypothesizes that potential
offenders behave like rational economic
actors. That is, they choose between legal
and illegal options after weighing the
costs and benefits of each. This model
also argues that labor market success is
related to individual differences in
productivity. Productive workers, of
course, are rewarded with jobs and high
wages. Workers become more productive by
acquiring a stock of human capital
(education, training skills, work exper-
ience). In this pro-foundly individual-
istic view, workers who fail to "invest"
their time acquiring human capital will be
forced to settle for low wage jobs or
unemployment. Crime, then, is a rational
economic decision which can be deterred by
iDcreasing the costs (punishment) to the
individual.
Segmented labor market theories, on the
other hand, argue that the source of
structural unemployment and chronic poverty
lies in the heavy constraints exerted on
individuals by structural economic condi-
tions. As Doeringer and Piore (1975:72)
point out, "...the problem of unemployment
is rooted less in individual behavior (the
failure to acquire human capital) than in
the character of institutions and the
social patterns that derive from them."
Segmented labor market theories see capit-
alist economies as divided into two dis-
tinct markets. The primary market offers
jobs with high wages, good working con-
ditions, stability, security, and oppor-
tunity for advancement. The secondary
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(Thompson, Sviridoff, and McElroy,
1981:52).
How can the empirical relationship
between joblessness and crime be explained.
First and Foremost, critical criminologists
point out that unemployment enhances the
attractiveness of crime as a source of
income. As Michalowski (1983:16) notes,
unemployment "...depresses wages to the
level that some prefer crime over seeking
out low-paying jobs, while increasing the
temptation to commit crime for those who
are unemployed or able to find only
sporadic or part-time work." Second,
Michalowski (1983:17) argues that unemploy-
ment:
...tends to isolate individuals from
full integration into the society,
thus weakening the social bond between
the individual and the society. Thus,
even where individuals are not in
desperate economic situation, their
marginalization provides fertile
ground for the growth of criminal
incentives.
In addition, Michalowski notes that the
expectations of unemployment among youth
who have not yet sought jobs can produce
the same sense of marginalization.
Finally, Michalowski (1983:17) points out:
"...the loss of self-worth associated
with being without work is often a
basis for a generalized anger which
can find its expression in crime and
violence, when it is not turned inward
through such things as depression,
addiction, mental illness, and
alcoholism."
At the theoretical level, these
findings on the relationship between unem-
sector has jobs which are decidedly less
attractive. According to Piore (1977:94)
"They tend to involve low wages, poor
working conditions, considerable variab-
ility in employment, harsh and arbitrary
discipline, and little opportunity to
advance. The poor are confined to the
secondary labor market."
It is the existence of dual or
segmented labor markets under advanced
capitalism that generates the surplus
population. The structural unemployment
and under-employment of the secondary labor
market breeds the social conditions
conducive to traditional crime described by
Michalowski. Under such a view, crime
prevention policies should not be directed
toward individuals (increasing the costs of
illegal behavior), but instead toward the
economic and political structure which
generates illegal behavior. As Thompson,
Sviridoff, and McElroy (1981:19) point
out:
The disagreement between conventional
economics and the SLM theories is not
so much over whether individual labor
market participants, especially the
poor, are acting "rationally" in
committing crime, but over whether it
is necessary to account for an array
of structural, institutional, organi-
zational features of the economy in
order to arrive at a satisfactory
explanation of economic behavior.
Structured Inequality and Relative
Deprivation
Thus far, it has been argued that
traditional crime is rooted in the polit-
ical economy of advanced capitalist
society. The class structure and segmented
labor market of capitalist society system-
atically generates a surplus population
which is faced with structured unemployment
and chronic poverty and turns to crime as
either a means for survival or as a
response to the brutalized social condi-
tions of life it experiences. While this
theoretical statement constitutes a strong
explanation for traditional crime, it
remains incomplete. To this statement we
must now add the concepts of structured
income inequality and relative deprivation.
There is a growing body of empirical
evidence which shows a high correlation
between income inequality and official
rates of crime. What is especially inter-
esting to note about this research is that
is reveals a direct relationship between
income inequality and rates of violent
crime, as well as rates of property crime.
For example, Messner (1980), in a cross-
national study, demonstrates a significant
effect of income inequality on societal
murder rates. As he puts it (1980:193),
"The data, in short, indicate that high
murder rates tend to accompany high levels
of inequality in the distribution of
income." Furthermore, when Messner entered
a measure of the overall affluence or
poverty of the population into the
regression equation, the effects of the
inequality variable did not disappear. In
an earlier, less sophisticated cross-
national study, McDonald (1976) also found
a positive association between income
inequality and the murder rate.
Research on income distribution and
crime rates within the United States
supports the proposition that income
inequality is a significant determinant of
serious criminality. Danziger and Wheeler
(1975:113) used an econometric model to
test the hypothesis that "...shifts toward
a greater degree of inequality in the
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distribution of income and increases in the
absolute level of income when the distrib-
ution is constant, are both accompanied by
more crime." They analyzed the United
States for the period 1949-1970 and found
that "...fluctuations in crime rates are
generated by changes in the level and
distribution of income in the manner pre-
dicted by the theory" (1975:113). Loftin
and Hill (1974) present evidence to show
that economic inequality is the most
important predictor of homicide rates when
American states are compared. Both Eberts
and Schwirian (1968) and Braithwaite (1979)
demonstrate that United States Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) with
a high level of income inequality have high
crime rates. In a more recent study, Blau
and Blau (1982:121) present data on the 125
largest American SMSAs which show that
"...income inequality in a metropolis sub-
stantially raises its rate of criminal
violence." They conclude (1982:126) "High
rates of criminal violence are apparently
the price of racial and economic
inequalities.
These studies add an important dimen-
sion to our understanding of the relation-
ship between economic conditions and crime.
It is the distribution of income which
appears to be the primary variable which
explains this relationship. Poverty, per
se, does not explain traditional crime. It
is the degree of inequality which is the
important factor here, not the size of the
poverty population. The crimes of the
poor, therefore, may be less a matter of
survival than of relative deprivation. As
Braithwaite (1979:216-217) notes this is a
finding of some theoretical significance:
The finding that the size of the gap
between the average income earner and
poor families is correlated with
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crime, but not the number who, are
poor, is of considerable theoretical
importance. It may be that, when
there are only a small number of poor
'families in a city, these families
feel a far more acute sense of missing
out on the benefits of the Great
Society than do poor families who are
in cities where they are surrounded by
many other families in exactly the
same plight. Policies that reduce the
number of poor people should certainly
reduce the propensity to crime of
those people lifted out of poverty,
but do they at the same time create
even greater despair, frustration, and
criminality amongst those who remain
poor?
The importance -of the concept of
relative deprivation in explanations of the
relationship between economic factors and
crime was recognized as far back as the
time of Quetelet and Guerry (Messner,
1980). Marxian criminologists have made
use of the concept too. Bonger (1916:91)
pointed out that, "it is not the total
amount of wealth, but the manner of its
distribution that bears most importantly
upon criminality." In summary of Bonger's
work, Austin Turk (19'69.11) commented:
"The potency of economic want as a factor
in crime causation is mainly determined by
whether or not poverty is experienced as
relative deprivation, in a social context
(capitalism) wherein people are taught to
equate economic advantage with intrinsic
superiority and disadvantage with
inferiority."
Much of the literature on relative
deprivation and crime suggests that this
formulation can best be used to explain
property crime. And indeed, there is a
considerable amount of empirical evidence
to support this proposition (Chester,
1976). However, many of the studies
reviewed above demonstrate that there is a
strong relationship between income
inequality, relative deprivation, and rates
of violent crime too. As Blau and Blau
(1982:122) point out "...the relative
deprivation produced by much inequality
rather than the absolute deprivation
produced by much poverty provides the most
fertile soil for criminal violence." The
social process inferred by Blau and Blau is
that inequality creates alienation,
despair, and pent-up aggression which is
often expressed in acts of criminal
violence. As they note (1982:119):
Ascriptive socioeconomic inequalities
undermine the social integration of a
community by creating multiple para-
llel social differences which widen
the separations between ethnic groups
and between social classes, and it
creates a situation characterized by
much social disorganization and
prevalent latent animosities. Pronoun-
ced ethnic inequality in resources
implies that there are great riches
within view, but not within reach of
many people destined to live in
poverty. There is much resentment,
frustration, hopelessness, and alien-
ation.
From the critical perspective, these
structured inequalities which result in
perceptions of relative deprivation are
rooted in the political economy of
capitalist society. Thus, only radical
social structural change can reduce the
level of inequality and hence reduce the
level of crime. Before this suggestion and
other crime prevention policies which flow
from a Marxist analysis of crime can be
discussed, however, it is important to
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examine one final dimension of the
perspective's approach to crime causation.
The Destruction of Cooperative Social
Relationships and Community
The structural level forces we have
been examining must be the starting point
for any analysis of crime, as the critical
perspective rightly insists. There are,
however, other levels of analysis that must
also be considered. Paul Friday (1981:191)
argues that theories of crime tend to focus
on one of three possible levels: The
structural level, the system level, and the
individual level. Structural level
theories, such as Marxism, attempt to
explain crime as -a product of forces
external to the individual and beyond his
or her control. Political economy, struc-
tural unemployment, and income inequality
are examples of structural level forces.
System level theories explain crime as a
function of social institutions such as the
family, peer groups, community organ-
izations, and schools. As Friday
(1981:191) points out: "Each of thesystem
forces are directly related to structural
conditions., but the individual has some
interaction with a unit of each system, and
has some impact on that unit in turn." The
final level is the individual level, which
consists of theories which focus on the
conditions surrounding the act itself.
An adequate theory of crime, and one
that will have the greatest policy implica-
tions, is one which succeeds in integrating
these levels, demonstrating the linkages
between them. As Friday (1981:192) notes
"Explanations which have been restricted to
only one level of analysis have limited
utility." The Marxist explanation of
crime, therefore, cannot remain forever on
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the structural level. The theory must
explain how larger political and economic
structures impact on systems level
institutions and on individuals. While the
structural forces discussed above are the
centerpiece of a Marxist theory of crime,
we need to understand how these forces are
mediated through other social institutions
and the processes by which these forces
differentially shape the conditions
surrounding the individual act. For as
Friday (1981:194) points out:
The individual act cannot be explained
directly by the urban industrial
structural conditions. These condi-
tions, none-the-less, contribute indi-
rectly to it by differentially affect-
ing the institutions responsible for
developing commitments to conformity:
the family, school community groups,
and work. Forces affecting the crim-
inal act at the institutional level
reflect the fact that all societies
have norms and expectations which are
learned through socialization in the
family, in school, and through vol-
untary and neighborhood groups in the
community.
Critical criminologists, in general,
have been slow to address this issue. They
are content to remain at the level of the
political and economic structure since the
social formation as a whole is so often
ignored in criminological theory. A few
critical criminologists, however, have
started to explore the relationships be-
tween the larger structures of society and
its "soft" institutions, and the implica-
tions of these relationships for crimin-
ality. For example, Elliott Currie (1982)
has noted the relationship between economic
conditions, family life, and developmental
disturbances. One parent (usually female)
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families, according to Currie (1982:22)
"...produce a disproportionate amount of
aggression and violence in children not
because they have one parent of because
that parent is a woman, but because they
typically lack enough outside resources,
human and material, to insure an adequate
developmental environment." The develop-
mental disturbances that result in crime,
according to Currie, are not attributable
to the absence of the father, but to the
stresses and lack of support systems that
alter family functioning. "The same
developmental damage" argues Currie
(1982:22) "is equally likely to take place
in two parent families plagued b% severe
internal conflict or abuse."
The family, in other words, is being
buffeted and often ripped apart by larger
structural conditions such as unemployment,
inequality, and alienation. And the impact
of such forces is not confined to the
family, but affects peer relationships,
schools, and community organizations, as
well. Under monopoly capitalism, coopera-
tive social relationships within these
social institutions are destroyed. As Tony
Platt (1978:31) points out:
Monopoly capitalism emiserates in-
creasingly larger portions of the
working class and proletarianizes the
lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie,
degrades workers' skills and compe-
tency in the quest for higher product-
ivity, and organizes family and
community life on the basis of its
most effective exploitability. it
consequently makes antagonism rather
than reciprocity the norm of social
relationships.
Under the political economy of advanced
capitalism, Platt (1978:31) goes on to
argue, "...family and peer relationships
become even more brutal and attenuated."
All individual, family, and social needs
become subordinated to the market and
reshaped to serve the needs of capital.
Capitalist development results in the
atomization of social life and human coop-
erative relationships are increasingly
replaced by impersonal market transactions
(Braverman, 1974). These conditions exert
enormous pressures and strains on the
family in particular, and they are
profoundly hostile to all feelings of
community in general Delinquency, vio-
lence, and other forms of social pathology
are the direct result of the material
foundations of cooperative social relations
capitalist s~ociety° As Michalows i
LJA ) notes.
The frustraticn, alienation, and sense
o competitivencss generated by
socially-structured ineqvu ality most
ofter turns the less powerful against
one another either in emulation of
the predatory, exploitive, and appar-
ently rewarding practices of the more
powerful, or in simple expression of
impotent fury with their lives.
Humans do not generally attack the
person or property of those with whom
they feel a sense of community.
Inequality, however, tends to destroy
community, thus making almost anyone
fair game to exploit for personal ends
This propensity is fueled by both
ideological and material forces which
tend to weaken or even prevent the
emergence of any real sense of soli-
darity with the working class,
Another dimension to this analysis is
added by T, R. Young (1978). He argues
that the loss of social standing or social.
significance of indJvidualIs under capital-
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ism is the key to understanding traditional
crime (1978:11):
It is not the poverty of the surplus
population which is the interesting
dynamic in crime - poor people in
Japan and China don't commit crime.
The important variable is the loss of
social standing (social honor, social
significance, social status, Stande or
social relationships) which is the
central dynamic. One does not rape,
rob, or assault those who have social
standing in the eyes of the aggressor.
As Young (1978:11) goes on to note:
It is intrinsic to the nature of
capitalism that- social relationships
and community be destroyed in a
society. If one has nothing to ex-
change in a capitalistic society, one
is not provided goods and services.
Social standing depends upon funds -
without cash or credit one is denied
standing by virtue of the rule of
capitalism: exchange for profit.
Community is destroyed as well. In
folk society, the surplus value of
labor is used to provide community in
the form of ceremonies, festivities,
games, and other collective endeavor.
In capitalism, the surplus value of
labor is appropriated to the capital-
ist or tO his/her agent for private
use rather than communal use.
...With the loss of social
relationship and community; with the
individualism of the capitalist mode;
with the use of every social good or
service as commodity, the self-
centered quest for material wealth we
call call crime proliferates.
As these writings suggest, Marxist or
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critical criminologists are beginning to
come to grips with the question of how
structural forces impact on systems level
institutions as part of a complex process
of crime causation. The political and eco-
nomic structures of capitalist society are
viewed as undermining cooperative social
relationships within the family, peer
groups, and the community. These struc-
tural forces, thus, differentially affect
the ability of these institutions to effec-
tively socialize the young and develop role
relationships conducive to non-criminal
behavior. It is at this point that main-
stream criminological theory might be able
t be integae into a Mrxian theory of
crime. And, it is a.lso at thi-Js point, t v.,o
cri.tcal crimino log ists mtay be abLe 0
develop miore specii Ic ir 0 'ri t0
Pro 1~ C i. ItII is to this issu of:(
control, p oicy that we now turn
CRIME PREVENTION POLICY: A CRITICA-L
PERSPECTIVE
If the social structure is an impor-
tant constraint on the behavior of
individuals and institutions, then
there are limits to the change that is
possible to induce in individuals or
institutions without changing the
social structure. Vocational training
for prisoners for instance, will not
eradicate unemployment or do away with
low wage industries. Even when indi-
viduals can be helped the larger
problem remains. To deal with crime
by "treating" individuals is like
trying to empty the ocean with a
bucket (Greenberg, 1981:18).
The arguments of this paper, thus farr
can be briefly summarized. First of all,
the question of "law and order", of the
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prevention of traditional street crime, is
both real and important. For too long,
critical criminologists have not addressed
themselves seriously to the problem of
street crime, and the fears and anxieties
it produces for people in their everyday
lives. Furthermore, the victims of such
crime are disproportionately members of the
working classes in late capitalist soci-
eties. The victimization and demoral-
ization of working class neighborhoods and
popular anxieties about crime within
society as a whole must be a major concern
of critical criminology.
Second, this paper has argued that most
traditional crime control policies and
programs, based on individualistic perspec-
tives on crime, are doomed to failure.
Approaches to crime prevention which at-
tempt to punish or treat individual actors
cannot succeed, in the long run, in re-
ducing criminal behavior. This is because
criminal behavior is rooted in the funda-
mental structural features of a society,
especially in the political and economic
structure of late capitalist societies.
This point leads to a third element of
the paper's argument. There is now develop-
ing a critical theory of traditional crime
which advances considerably our under-
standing of this kind of crime. A rough
outline of this theory was sketched out
above and the empirical research lending
support to it (not all of it by critical
criminologists to be sure) was reviewed..
The question that now needs to be addressed
is what implications does such a theory
have for crime prevention policy?
Although space limitations prevent an
extended discussion, several crime preven-
tion strategies that flow from the critical
theory outlined above are presented. Two
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distinct levels are addressed. First, a
broad societal level which concerns major
changes in the political and economic or-
ganization of late capitalist societies is
discussed. Second, the question of spec-
ific policies within existing capitalistic
structures is considered.
The Reconstruction of Socialist Policy
Progressive criminologists generally
agree that any resolution to the
contemporary problems of crime will
necessitate a ie form of transition to
some form of socialism. This view is
based on the recognition that both
working class varieties of common
crime and the more organized and
destructive forms of social injury
committed by, or in service to, the
powerful are grounded in the social
conflicts and exploitative relations
that characterize life in class
society. (Mischalowski, 1983:13)
If traditional crime is indeed rooted
in the structural features of capitalist
society, one obvious solution to the crime
problem would seem to be radical structural
change. Many Marxist criminologists have
argued that the overthrow of capitalism and
its replacement by socialism will leave
society crime free. Stripped of its
utopian overtones, there is considerable
merit to this idea. It can be argued
convincingly that there would be far less
crime in a more equal, more just, socialist
society. As the British criminologist Ian
Taylor (1982:xv-xvi) has put it:
So - although it will appear as a
dogmatism - we can assert that the
essential significance of a very high
rate of interpersonal and property
violence in a society is that it
expresses the lack of socialism in the
personal and social relations of that
society. And we can define the absent
socialism here, quite conventionally,
as a political and social formation
which guarantees equality of life-
chances and mutual regard between
people, irrespective of race, age, and
sex. It is the obverse, therefore, of
the conditions that exist in an
unreformed class society like Britain
today.
From this perspective, therefore, the
single best crime prevention strategy would
be to replace capitalism with socialism.
Aside from the fact that this is an
exceedingly simplistic idea, there are
problems with the notion that socialism
will drastically reduce the level of crime
in society. As Braithwaite (1979:243) has
argued, "...the overthrow of capitalism is
not a panacea for crime which knows no
limitations. The overthrow of capitalism
creates merely the potential for a more
equal and less segregated society."
Braithwaite goes on to point out that gross
inequalities in wealth and power persist in
the so-called socialist societies that do
exist, and the available evidence suggests
that the lower classes in these societies
also-have the highest rate of crime.
One obvious problem in this kind of
discussion is the fact that there are many
different conceptions of socialism and many
different existing social for~ations that
call themselves socialist. There does
appear to be, however, two major traditions
of modern socialism, both of which are
seriously deficient, according to Alan Hunt
(1982:16):
The "revolutionary" tradition looks to
a revolutionary upheaval which has not
come and which seems more distant
today than it was when the socialist
movement was born. The "social
democratic" tradition, after long and
varied experiences of exercising
governmental power in many European
nations, has not produced any decisive
social, political or economic change
that reveals the possibility of a new
socialist order. Indeed, in their
different ways, both traditions have
created political and state systems
that are distant from the people and
have not released democratic and
popular participation in social,
economic, and political life. The
authoritarianism of the socialism of
the East and the paternalism of the
socialism of the West have both
contributed to an undermining of the
popular appeal of socialism.
If' the creation of a socialist society
is to be a primary way of reducing
traditional crime (among many other social
problems) then we will have to develop a
new socialist tradition, one which will
release democratic and popular partici-
pation in social, political and economic
life. As Taylor (1982) has argued, we need
to have a "reconstruction of socialist
policy." The argument for socialism once
again, has to be made. This time, however,
socialists will have to develop a more
specific blueprint for a democratic
socialist society which offers a positive
alternative conception of the Welfare State
to replace the "tattered and discredited
reality we still defend." (Deacon,
1981:46).
What would a "reconstructed socialist
policy" look like? What elements would it
contain? Again, space prohibits an extended
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discussion, but we can examine some of the
arguments Taylor (1981; 1982) has advanced
in LAM and Order: Arguments for • aIi m-.
and elsewhere. First of all, Taylor
clearly rejects the anti-statism of a
libertarian character which ran through
much of the early literature of the radical
criminologists (Hunt, 1982). He (1981:100)
insists upon "...the recognition of a state
form as a necessary element in the
administration of complex industrial
societies...o Thus, in the current period
it is important to enter into the struggle
over state policy in all areas. Secondly,
Taylor argues the necessity of "social
order" and thus of the necessity for some
form of criminal justice apparatus. The
issue, for him, is to create a "new" social
.order ("a social order for all", p. 123)
and a democratization of the criminal
justice process.
The key element in Taylor's socialist
strategy is the thoroughgoing democratiza-
tion of the entire social order. This
aspect of social reconstruction must begin
at the local level to fulfill immediate,
pressing needs. Economic decision-making
must be democratized, Production must be
organized rationally to fulfill continuing
and often unmet social needs for goods,
services, and employment'. This notion of
economic democracy has recently taken hold
over the left in the United States. The
essence of economic democracy is to
transfer economic decision-making from the
few to the many; from private groups to
public councils; from the corporate elite
to workers, consumers, and local
communitieso Econowic democracy, thus,
requires, "the shift of irnvesment control
from corporate domination to the, public;
and the reconstruction of economic decision
making through democratic worker - and
worker/consumer - controlled production"
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(Carnoy and Shearer, 1980:4).
The state itself, according to Taylor,
will have to be democratized from within.
This would include such things as the
democratization of policing, of the staff-
ing of correctional centers, and even of
the judiciary. Over and over, Taylor
stresses the importance of the state in the
reconstruction of socialist policy. He is
aware of the Dangers of reformism, but he
underlines (1982:xviii) "...the importance
of creating a set of demands for alter-
native and socialist arrangements in every
area in which the state imposes itself on
the citizens of our unequal class society."
The reconstruction of socialist policy
as outlined by Taylor is an important
source of ideas about what kind of
socialist society might replace late cap-
italism and even welfare state capitalism.
These ideas and others must now be worked
over, developed, and linked to a viable
political strategy if we are serious about
creating a new social order in which there
will be far less crime (and far fewer
social pathologies in general) then we
currently experience under the political
economy of capitalism. As Taylor (1982:13)
points out, however, this will take a lot
of hard work to accomplish:
A vast amount of work needs to be done
on the reconstruction of orthodox
socialist policy. But the required
features of any reconstructed social
democracy are clear: the fragmented
working class will only be mobilized
when it sees an economic and social
strategy which transparently (and
therefore democratically) fulfills its
immediate, pressing social needs. The
socialism which does this must'
obviously be clearly distinguishable
from the authoritarian state form or
"social deomocracy" of the earlier
period, constructed in defense of an
allegedly equal partnership of capital
and labor. ...A popular desire for
such a socialism may emerge out of the
process of community dislocation,
which is now in full flow in cap-
italist societies, but it will require
socialists working in political
parties and engaging openly and
publicly in ideological struggles
against the Right in order to sustain
and advance it.
Specific Pol _tQ_ _ght Crime
While the reconstruction of socialist
policy in the west is critically important,
it is only one level at which work must go
on. If we are truly concerned about reduc-
ing the amount of traditional crime that
plagues our societies and alleviating the
victimization of working class neighbor-
hoods, we must formulate and fight for
specific policies that will operate right
now, within the structure of the existing
political economy. These policies will
hopefully be, in Taylor's (1982) words,
"prefigurative socialist programs," but the
criterion by which we should judge them is
whether or not they will reduce crime.
The specific recommendations to be
presented here, are derived primarily from
a recent article by American criminologist
Elliot Currie (1982). He lists three key
areas of intervention which recent evidence
point to as likely to have the greatest
effect on crime rates. These areas of
intervention are the labor market, the
family, and the network of community
supports. Each Will be discussed in turn.
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The first and most important recommen-
dation that can be made to reduce existing
capitalist societies is to recommend the
adoption of a full employment policy. As
Currie (1982:21) notes concerning the
situation in the United States, "It's
hardly accidental that every advanced
society with a lower level of violent crime
than ours has also historically had a much
more effective and humane employment policy
providing better cushions against the
disintegrative and degrading effects of
'market' forces." Attaining a full employ-
ment economy is not only a major step
toward a less crime ridden society, it is,
as Michael Harrington (1980:82) has pointed
out, the "precondition" of any progressive
solution to the problems which confront
late capitalist society.
The central importance of a full employ-
ment policy in reducing crime appears to be
well understood in the west. Yet there is
little movement toward such a policy,
especially in the United States and Great
Britain. The main reason for this is the
fact that governments in capitalist societ-
ies prefer to rely on the private sector to
produce jobs. The private sector, however,
as has been well demonstrated (See
Harrington, 1980), cannot and will not move
us in the direction of full employment.
The only way a full employment economy can
be reached is through the provision of
public jobs and planned social investment.
Even the Reagan administration in the U.S.
began to get that message, and in early
1983, backed the passage of a public jobs
bill (a rather inadequate jobs bill, but a
jobs bill nonetheless). More such bills
are necessary if we are at all serious
about reducing crime.
Still, the provision of jobs alone is
not the only issue to be considered from a
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crime prevention standpoint. As Currie
(1982:21) points out, "The economic context
of crime is not just the rate of unemploy-
ment itself, but the more general cond-
itions of the secondary labor market." He
reviews a RAND study of California "repeat-
ers" which illustrates the strengths of
this connection. As Currie (1982:21)
notes:
This [study] suggests that job quality
and stability are the real issues.
Simply forcing the urban unemployed
into new variants of low-wage, menial
labor as much current [Reagan] admini-
stration urban policy proposes, won't
begin to come to grips with urban
crime. Nor can we expect much help
from a strategy- of general economic
expansion if it doesn't include well-
targeted employment and training
programs for the kinds of people
typically left behind.
A strong jobs policy, therefore, one
that deals with the issue of job quality
and stability, must be our first order re-
sponse to the crime problem (especially
youth crime). The state must be pressured
to pursue this course. Not only is it more
effective to create jobs than to build
prisons, but is is also less expensive.
The left must stay the course on this issue
and attempt to counter the resistance of
the private sector to public jobs programs.
A second area of intervention to reduce
crime, according to Currie is the family.
Given the evidence of the fragmentation of
families and the developmental disturbances
that can occur within them due to the
adverse impact of economic factors, it is
important to develop comprehensive multi-
service programs for high risk families.
Currie (1982:22) quotes psychologist E. M.
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Hetherington who has said, "it is critical
to develop social policies and intervention
procedures that will reduce stresses and
develop new support systems for single
parent families." Currie (1982:22) then
comments that "changing the pinched and
deeply stressful state of dependent poor
families can have an impact on youth crime
in fairly short order."
What kind of service programs for dep-
endent poor families would help to reduce
crime? Currie cites the Child and Family
Resource Programs (CFPR) sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare as an exemplar. These programs
provided the following kinds of services to
poor families: crisis intervention, educa-
tion against child abuse, family counsel-
ing, Head Start and tutoring programs,
meals for children, and pre- and post-natal
health counseling. All of these programs
were designed to encourage parent involve-
ment in policymaking. The results of these
programs, overall, were excellent. Currie
(1982:23) cites the conclusions of a U.S.
Government Accounting Office evaluation of
CFPR in summarizing the impact of family
intervention programs on crime rates:
The GAO argued that these early child-
hood intervention programs would
reduce delinquency mainly through
improving early parent-child relations
and school performance, and both
possibilities fit well with what a
growing body of research has to say
about family and developmental influ-
ences on youth and adult crime. We
don't know how much crime we could
prevent by developing a better range
of supports for early child develop-
ment. We do know that there are very
good reasons for especting the effects
to be substantial.
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In addition to the family, a third area
of intervention for crime reduction is the
network of community supports. Although
"community" has become a kind of predic-
table buzzword on both the left and right,
and although just about everybody agrees
that-"community" is important in preventing
crime, Currie (1982:23) argues that
"...nearly everyone has a different concep-
tion of what community means and what might
be done to create or restore it." He
reviews the variety of community crime
prevention programs initiated in the United
States in the 1970s by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA), The
results of these efforts, he argues, were
ambiguous. He sees nothing wrong in Vrinc-
iple with such progr-ams as "'Neighborhood
Watch" or the organization of civilian
anti-crime patrols, but he cautions that
such programs are ".-likely to have
limited impact as long as the larger forces
ripping apart the community's infra-
structure.are left intact."
What's most important in community
crime prevention, according to Currie
(1982:24), are "the broader forces that
make fo commuinity stability and sustain
local social networks." He argues
(1984:24) that, "one of the most damaging
flaws in liberal tinkWing about social
policy has beeiA ils tendency to downplay
the importance of socikal bonds and communal
sukpp)orts in pevenlting or miLtigating social
pathology." A nAmber of radical criminolog-
ists, in addition to Currie, have recently
echoed these sentiments and have begun
exploring the issue of community critte
prevention (Browning, 1982, Bute, 1982,
Gross, 1982).
The most compelling approach to crime
prevention on the community level,
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according to Currie, is the idea of creat-
ing "mediating structures" to prevent Var-
ious kinds of social pathologies. By "med-
iating structures" is meant intermediate
institutions such as neighborhoods, kinship
structures, and ethnic organizations, which
lay between individuals and larger bureau-
cratic structures. One example cited by
Currie is Philadelphia's House of Umoja, a
community based residential program for
black youth gang members. Reviewing the
evidence on the crime-preventing role of
"mediating structuresu, Currie (1982:24)
concludes:
A large and growing body of research
has demonstrated the importance of
communal networks of support in miti-
gating the impact of social and
economis stress, with very significant
consequences not only for crime, but
for physical and mental health as
well.
A number of cross-national studies also
suggest the significance of community
networks of support in preventing crime.
Currie (1984:24) points to Japan and
Switzerland, and argues that the low crime
rates in these two countries can be traced
back to the fact that economic development
in these nations appears to have taken
place "within the bounds of pre-existing
ties of kinship and local community."
Currie (1982:25) concludes that, "One clear
implication of this is that much could be
gained, over the long term, through inte-
grating community programs specifically
designed for crime prevention with broader
strategies of locally based economic devel-
opment."
CONCLUSION: THE STATE MUST SERVE AS A
POSITIVE FORCE FOR CRIME PREVENTION
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Critical criminologist argue that the
causes of traditional crime are located in
the political and economic structure of
capitalist society. A reduction in crime,
therefore, depends upon major political and
economic changes. The crime prevention
strategies recommended in this paper all
require positive interventions by the state
in the social and economic organization of
society. In all Western nations, particu-
larly in the United States and Great
Britain, conservatives, both in and out of
government, insist that "government" is
powerless to do anything about the causes
of crime; that the governments' only proper
role is to punish offenders and maintain
law and order. As Currie (1982:25) points
out, however:
In fact, of course, the opposite is
true. "Government" in the United
States is already deeply implicated in
policies that cause families and
communities to disintegrate, and in
deflecting policies that might help
hold them together. "Government,"
indeed, can fairly be said to have
followed a pro-crime policy for years.
Government tax and- subsidy policies
supported the vast' uprooting of pop-
ulation through a "modernization" of
agriculture closely entwined with the
disintegration of the social fabric of
the cities. Government spurred the
out-migration of industry and jobs
that aggravated it further. Govern-
ment regularly induces unemployment,
community decline, and geographic up-
rooting in the service of the putative
fight against inflation. Government
helps subsidize the multinationals'
cataclysmic reordering of social life
in the "developing" world... Under the
auspices of the right, "government"
-286-
will certainly do so even more, by
aligning itself ever more closely with
the most disintegrative forces of the
private market.
In support of the interests of capital
the state promotes policies that bear a
large part of the responsibility for the
high levels of crime and violence that
plague many western nations. But the state
is not simply a tool or instrument of cap-
italistic interests. The state in late
capitalism is an autonomous power and an
object of class struggle. Critical crimin-
ologists and the left in general must enter
into the struggle over state policy. It is
only through political action and pressure
on a variety of fronts that we will be able
to achieve significant reforms now and the
eventual democratization of the social
order as a whole in the future. Not only
do we hope to achieve a more equal and just
society in this process, but also a
significant reduction in the level of
traditional crime. While the punishment
(even by incarceration) of individuals
surely has a place in any future crime
control strategy, as does the rehabilita-
tion or treatment of troubled individuals,
only the kind of structural changes
proposed by critical criminologists will
alleviate the victimization of our society
by crime.
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